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Alfred Mele’s new book explores the question of whether and how an agent’s history is 
relevant to her moral responsibility for a present action.  
Consider Chuck and Sally. Suppose that both persons are morally responsible at least 
sometimes for their actions and are morally responsible to some significant extent for their 
character. Chuck has very bad character that strongly inclines him to murder, whereas Sally’s 
very good character makes murder unthinkable. But those treacherous neuroscientists are at it 
again. They erase Sally’s good values and replace them with bad values that are qualitatively 
identical to Chuck’s values. On this bad day, Sally acts solely on those new values and murders 
in a way that is qualitatively identical to the way in which Chuck murders; when the day is over, 
the neuroscientists return Sally to her pre-manipulated values. By hypothesis, Chuck is morally 
responsible for murder. But is Sally also morally responsible for murder? Mele’s intuition is that 
Sally is not. But since the values, deliberations, intentions, and actions of Chuck and Sally are 
qualitatively identical with respect to the murder, this difference in moral responsibility 
evaluation must be explained by historical differences. 
Mele’s thesis is roughly that both compatibilists and incompatibilists should adopt a 
historical condition on moral responsibility to accommodate intuitions such as the one that Sally 
is not morally responsible for murder.  
In chapter one, Mele defines the standard terms in the free will debate, and provides a 
brief argument for one way in which an agent’s history is relevant to her moral responsibility. 
Consider another pair of persons, Van and Ike. Van gets himself drunk and drives home, whereas 
Ike is force-fed alcohol and is placed into his vehicle to drive home. Both are too drunk to know 
that they are impaired, and both unwittingly kill a pedestrian. Plausibly, Van is morally 
responsible for killing the pedestrian, and Ike is not. But because neither person satisfies the 
conditions on moral responsibility at the time of drunk driving, Van must be indirectly morally 
responsible—that is, his moral responsibility must be wholly derived from his previous free 
choices to consume alcohol in the way that he did (p. 11). Thus, a differential moral 
responsibility assessment of Van and Ike is grounded in their different histories. 
In chapter two, Mele defends his primary contention that history is relevant to direct 
moral responsibility, which is the kind of moral responsibility that is not entirely derived from 
other things (p. 11). He does so in part by arguing against Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical view of 
moral responsibility. On Frankfurt’s view, an agent is morally responsible for an action if the 
agent acts on a desire in a wholehearted way, but how she came to have that desire and psychic 
integration is irrelevant to her moral responsibility. Frankfurt’s view is problematic precisely 
because Sally’s desires can be manipulated such that she desires to kill her neighbor in a 
wholehearted way; and yet, we still have the intuition that Sally is not morally responsible for the 
murder, even though Frankfurt’s sufficient condition on moral responsibility has been satisfied. 
(This counterexample applies mutatis mutandis to other history-insensitive compatibilist views.) 
But why do Mele and others have this non-responsibility intuition about Sally’s murder 
(see the book’s appendix for experimental philosophical data)? Here is a Galen Strawson-style 
explanation: an agent must be morally responsible for the character that explains her action to be 
morally responsible for the action and Sally is not morally responsible for the manipulated 
character that explains her action. In my view, Mele rightly rejects that explanation (pp. 30-34). 
Instead, Mele offers “considerations that loom large” for him in explaining the intuition: “Sally’s 
pre-transformation character was sufficiently good that killing George was not even an option for 
her; and the combination of this fact with the fact that Sally was morally responsible (to some 
significant extent) for that character, facts about her history that account for her moral 
responsibility for that character, facts about her post-manipulation values and associated abilities, 
and the facts that account for her killing George suffices for her not being morally responsible 
for killing him” (p. 26, italics in the original). Mele appeals to this fact-list explanation 
throughout the book (pp. 37, 51, 57-58, 88, 125).  
Now, the fact-list explanation does provide a window into moral responsibility. But the 
window would have been bigger and the glass would have been clearer if Mele were to have 
provided some uniting explanation about why these facts suffice to undermine moral 
responsibility. Such an explanation would, for example, provide insight into cases in which 
Sally’s character is less good or she is less morally responsible for her character. It may even 
offer new understanding into how we become morally responsible agents in the first place.  
In chapter three, Mele defends taking seriously his non-responsibility intuition about 
Sally’s murder in response to contrary intuition pumps by Michael McKenna. Additionally, Mele 
argues that the non-responsibility intuition should be preserved even in Manuel Vargas’s 
revisionist account of moral responsibility. 
In chapter four, Mele argues against the common idea (à la Frankfurt, Richard Double, 
Gary Watson) that being a compatibilist requires affirming a history-insensitive view of moral 
responsibility. The common idea is that if the historical manipulation in Sally’s case undermines 
her moral responsibility for murder, then an action’s being causally determined by factors 
outside of its agent’s control also undermines moral responsibility for the action, which amounts 
to the denial of compatibilism. In response, Mele denies the conditional. He differentiates Sally’s 
case from a case of mundane causal determinism, and even from a case of “original design” in 
which a goddess configures a zygote and its consequent environment to ensure that the agent 
performs a particular action thirty years later. What is the relevant difference? It is that the 
aforementioned fact-list explanation applies to Sally’s case but not the others (pp. 88-89). Mele 
concludes that compatibilism does not entail that moral responsibility is ahistorical, or, more 
modestly, that compatibilists have not provided a good reason to believe that such an entailment 
holds. But then, there is room for compatibilists to tack on Mele’s historical condition to their 
other conditions for moral responsibility.  
In chapter five, Mele continues to reflect on radical reversal and original design 
scenarios, and he considers the question of when compatibilists should bite the bullet on 
manipulation and original design cases used to support incompatibilism. 
In chapter six, Mele contends that even incompatibilists should adopt his historical 
condition (p. 126). For although the occurrence of indeterminism at the moment of choice 
precludes an indeterministic agent’s being manipulated to choose a particular option, the range of 
live options is subject to manipulation. So, if Sally is manipulated to have Chuck-style values 
such that the range of her alternative possibilities at a particular time is exhausted by which 
innocent person to kill, Mele intuits that Sally is not morally responsible for murder. This chapter 
also features an interesting Q&A about Mele’s methodology in the book. 
Mele’s load-bearing argument for his historical condition rests on and only on his 
intuition in radical reversal cases and the accompanying fact-list explanation. Mele explicitly 
states that he does not rely on his appendix’s experimental data to support his conclusion, but he 
would have been worried if it revealed that a majority of people do not share his intuition (pp. 
147-148). Mele also considers other kinds of case (instant agents, minutelings, etc.), but does not 
appeal to them to support his position either (pp. 32, 60). One result of the exclusive focus on 
radical reversal cases is that his historical condition on direct moral responsibility is tailor-made 
to apply to only that kind of case (see pp. 66-67). As Mele says at one point, “This book takes us 
part of the way” (p. 38). There is still more work to be done to provide a full account of the 
historical condition on direct moral responsibility. Even so, the argument in this book has 
significant implications for ahistorical compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility, and for 
incompatibilist accounts of moral responsibility too. Proponents of such accounts would do well 
to reflect on Mele’s new book. 
Readers of Mele’s Autonomous Agents, Free Will and Luck, or recent articles on 
manipulation will encounter familiar material in Manipulated Agents. But they will also notice 
some refinements. For example, Mele now states his historical condition on moral responsibility 
without reference to “unsheddable values,” which is a term of art that has caused some confusion 
(pp. 66-68). Readers who are joining the conversation for the first time will find that 
Manipulated Agents provides an accessible overview of his earlier work as well as the state of 
his current thought. 
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